

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 SEPTEMBER 1964^{50X1}
~~TOP SECRET~~

1. South Vietnam

a. Khanh's moves thus far in shaping up his interim government are generally in line with Buddhist desires.

b. The triumvirate yesterday in effect restored "Big" Minh as nominal chief of state. He was given power to appoint and receive ambassadors, to grant amnesty, and to promulgate decrees proposed by the government and countersigned by Khanh as Premier. He was also charged with convening a national council by the end of September to decide on the provisional regime.

c. Khanh made it clear to Ambassador Johnson, however, that Minh could not make decisions without his concurrence.

d. We are not yet certain of the status of several military officers reportedly tagged for transfer or assignment abroad. Our embassy has learned, however, that Khanh has removed the 7th Division commander, the National Police director, and the chief of Gia Dinh Province surrounding Saigon. All three are Dai Viet officers.

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e. The ultimate objectives of the Buddhists are still ambiguous. They have told US officials that they are anti-Communist and anti-neutralist, but they also say that the government must eliminate local corruption and remove remnants of the Diem period. The Buddhist paper in Saigon has called on the Communist Liberation Front to stop the "painful war" and on the government to spare lives in its "necessary operations."

2. UK-Malaysia

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3. Congo

a. It appears that the OAU session in Addis Ababa will produce a resolution which will enhance the respectability of the Congo rebels.

b. Radical OAU members, harping on Tshombé's past record and his use of mercenaries, have been putting pressure on moderates to prove they are not "stooges" of "foreign interests." Radical influence was instrumental in having Ghana, Mali, Tanganyika, and Kenya--the leading Tshombé antagonists--named to the seven-nation committee to draft the resolution.

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d. The radicals are determined not to accept any OAU resolution which implies support for Tshombé. They are apparently prepared to split the OAU on this issue if necessary.

e. But the radicals have not yet been able to push through their demand for an OAU-supervised "round-table" gathering of all Congolese "factions." Haile Selassie's opposition to the idea yesterday was an indication of the moderates' concern over setting a precedent for OAU intervention in the internal affairs of a member state.

f. There has been no substantial change in the military situation in the Congo.

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4. Cyprus-Turkey

a. Inonu may be forced into a more inflexible position as a result of growing criticism of his government's Cyprus policy.

b. The parliamentary debate on Cyprus which began Monday will probably lead to a request for a vote of confidence. It could result in Inonu's resignation or in a coalition but even if he survives, he will probably be forced to display Turkish displeasure with the US.

c. [redacted] Ankara already is studying some of its bilateral agreements with the US. There will be threats to withdraw some special concessions to US personnel in Turkey, but there are no signs yet that major base agreements are under question.

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d. In Cyprus the general quiet continues. Makarios [redacted]

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[redacted] was lifting the economic blockade against the Turkish Cypriot communities at Famagusta and Larnaca. The blockade remains in effect against other communities.


5. Congo (Brazzaville)

a. Communist bloc countries are becoming more active in Congo (Brazzaville).



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c. The Brazzaville regime, believing it is threatened by Leopoldville, has been casting around for military help.



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d. On the diplomatic front, North Korea is pressing Brazzaville for recognition. Pyongyang's ambassador to Mali is in town claiming that his government's request for establishing relations has been accepted and that he is there to work out practical problems.

e. If full recognition is announced, the South Koreans would probably pull out of their embassy in Brazzaville in protest.

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
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B. Communist China The Chinese seem to have started a program to build up their naval capabilities in the Tonkin Gulf area.



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C. India The fall of the Congress Party government in Kerala state opens new opportunities for the Communists, who controlled the state from 1957 to 1959. If Shastri imposes "president's rule" from New Delhi, as seems likely, he may effect some measure of political stability before the state elections scheduled for February. New Delhi fears that the split in the Congress Party on local matters could give the Communists an edge if elections were held earlier.

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D. USSR - East Germany The Soviet military has begun to reduce the number of kommandaturas it established in East Germany after World War II. Initially set up to supervise local governments and deal with civil disturbances, the kommandaturas have become chiefly military police organizations. We expect to see a good many of the remaining 95 units dissolved for economic and political reasons.